…a complete reversal of the world of representation, and of the sense that ‘identical’ and ‘similar’ had in that world.

The eternal return is indeed the Similar, repetition in the eternal return is indeed the Identical – but precisely the resemblance and the identity do not pre-exist the return of that which returns. The do not in the first instance qualify what returns, they are indistinguishable from its return. It is not the same which returns, it is not the similar which returns; rather, the Same is the returning of that which returns, — in other words, of the Different; the similar is the returning of that which returns, – in other words, of the Dissimilar. The repetition in the eternal return is the same, but the same in so far as it is said uniquely of difference and the different. This is a complete reversal of the world of representation, and of the sense that ‘identical’ and ‘similar’ had in that world. (300)

We others, we immoralists,

Let us consider how naïve it is altogether to say: “Man ought to be such and such!” Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the abundance of a lavish play and change of forms—and some loafer of a moralist comments: “No! Man ought to be different.” He even knows what man should be like, this wretched bigot and prig: he paints himself on the wall and comments, “Ecce homo!” But even when the moralist addresses himself only to the single human being and says to him “you ought to be such and such!” he does not cease to make himself ridiculous.

We others, we immoralists, have, conversely, made room in our hearts for every kind of understanding, comprehending, and approving. We do not easily negate; we make it a point of honor to be affirmers. More and more, our eyes have opened to that economy which needs and knows how to utilize all hat the holy witlessness of the priest, of the diseased reason in the priest, rejects—that economy in the law of life which finds an advantage even in the disgusting species of the prigs, the priests, the virtuous, What advantage? We ourselves, we immoralists, are the answer. (491-492)

events explode, phenomena flash, like thunder and lightning

Once communication between heterogeneous series is established…Something ‘passes’ between the borders, events explode, phenomena flash, like thunder and lightning… A pure spatio-temporal dynamism, with its necessary participation in the forced movement, can be experienced only at the borders of the livable, under conditions beyond which it would entail the death of any well-constituted subject endowed with independence and activity. Embryology already displays the truth that there are systematic vital movements, torsions and drifts, that only an embryo can sustain: an adult would be torn apart by them. (118)

Two Repetitions (w/r/t Idea)

In every case, repetition is difference without a concept. But it one case, the difference is taken to be only external to the concept; it is a difference between objects represented by the same concept, falling into the indifference of space and time. In the other case, the difference is internal to the Idea; it unfolds as pure movement, creative of a dynamic space and time which correspond to the Idea. (23-24)

Represented in the inmost cell of thought is that which is unlike thought

Represented in the inmost cell of thought is that which is unlike thought. The smallest intra-mundane traits would be of relevance to the absolute, for the micrological view cracks the shells of what, measured by the subsuming cover concept, is helplessly isolated and explodes its identity, the delusion that it is but a specimen. There is solidarity between such thinking and metaphysics at the time of its fall. (406)

We therefore find ourselves confronted by two questions

We therefore find ourselves confronted by two questions: what is the concept of difference – one which is not reducible to simple conceptual difference but demands its own Idea, its own singularity at the level of Ideas? On the other hand, what is the essence of repetition – one which is not reducible to difference without concept, and cannot be confused with the apparent character of objects represented by the same concept, but bears witness to singularity as a power of Ideas? (27)

It is the essence of affirmation to be in itself multiple and to affirm difference

Affirmation, understood as the affirmation of difference, is produced by the positivity of problems understood as differential positings; multiple affirmation is produced by problematic multiplicity. It is of the essence of affirmation to be in itself multiple and to affirm difference. As for the negative, this is only the shadow cast upon the affirmations produced by a problem: negation appears alongside affirmation like a powerless double, albeit one which testifies to the existence of another power, that of the effective and persistent problem. (267)

The false genesis of affirmation

The false genesis of affirmation, which takes the form of the negation of the negation and is produced by the negative, is substituted for the complementarity of the positive and the affirmative, of differential positing and the affirmation of difference. (268)

Death:

the state of free differences when they are no longer subject to the form imposed upon them by an I or an ego, when they assume a shape which excludes my own coherence no less than that of any identity whatsoever. There is always a ‘one dies’ more profound than ‘I die’, and it is not only the gods who die endlessly and in a variety of ways; as though there appeared worlds in which the individual was no longer imprisoned within the personal form of the I and the ego, nor the singular imprisoned within the limits of the individual—in short, the insubordinate multiple (103).

Christian repetition is opposed to atheist repetition, and Kierkegaardian to Nietzschean,

Christian repetition is opposed to atheist repetition, and Kierkegaardian to Nietzschean, for in the case of Kierkegaard it is repletion itself which takes place once and for all, whereas according to Nietzsche it operates for all times. Nor is this simply a numerical difference; it is, rather, a fundamental difference between these two kinds of repetition. (295)